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Abstract—The paper presents a new header compression
mechanism for the IPv6 protocol. Its main benefit is the re-
duction of the overhead caused by IPSec tunnel mode which
enlarges datagrams in order to provide security services such
as authentication and secrecy.
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1. Introduction
In contrast to civil networks, tactical military computer net-
works lack the broad data rate links. This is especially true
for those tactical networks where the deployment is depen-
dent on a high mobility. Because of the necessity to utilize
wireless techniques or even open ISPs as transfer-nets, the
topic of security becomes ever more important. The cho-
sen security mechanism has to provide strong encryption
of the transported data regardless of the deployed applica-
tions, has to support an authentication mechanism to limit
the access and provide protection against a variety of at-
tacks. These requirements are fulfilled by IPSec [2], as well
as the need for a matching key exchange mechanism, the In-
ternet key exchange (IKE) [6]. With these components, the
communication of complete subnets can be secured using
IPSec gateways, building virtual private networks (VPNs).
In essence, every IP packet is completely encrypted in-
side another IP-packet, thereby hiding every information
about the application, the transmitted data and also about
the topology of the secured area.
The cost of the usage of IPSec tunnel mode is the growth
in the required data rate for the same amount of transmitted
data. To give an example, an Internet protocol Version 6
(IPv6) packet holds a header of 40 byte. IPSec tunnel
mode adds 40 byte IP-header for the transfer in the black,
i.e., unsecured network, then depending on the chosen au-
thentication algorithm around 22 bytes for the authentica-
tion header (AH) and again depending on the chosen en-
cryption algorithm another 22 bytes with a certain amount
of padding to obtain the necessary length. This still ignores
all application data.
Especially in narrow-bandwidth environments, e.g., com-
munication across HF, GSM or satellite, the overhead
caused by IPSec is not negligible. To enhance to perfor-
mance of IPSec, a header compression mechanism was de-
scribed in [5, 8]. The proposal resulted in the modification
of an existing IPSec implementation. The release supported
the following type of header compression. After a connec-
tion between two hosts inside two distinct secure subnets is
established, the black header is replaced by a small index
tag. Then the modified datagram is encrypted and encap-
sulated by the sending IPSec gateway. The receiving IPSec
machine verifies the mandatory authentication. On suc-
cess, it decrypts the payload and restores with the original
red IPv6 header by replacing the index tag. Comprehen-
sive tests substantiated the good performance of the header
compression approach. Alas the approach has an major
drawback. It is strictly link orientated and thus does not
work in a network topology consisting of various (i.e., more
than two) secure subnets.
This paper presents an enhancement of the above mech-
anism which works for arbitrary VPNs. It is developed
to work within the network resource manager (NRM) [7].
An NRM is a security gateway with extended functional-
ity. Besides enabling secure communications via IPSec, it
gathers information on the current network traffic. This sta-
tistical data can be used to estimate the available bandwidth
as well as the reliability of the existing connections. Fur-
thermore, the NRM supplies an enhanced connection man-
agement in order to support secure multicast-based group
communication and the corresponding key exchange mech-
anism (MIKE) as presented in [3].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the idea
behind the header compression mechanism is described.
The algorithms and data structures needed by header com-
pression are presented in Sections 3 and 4, respectively.
Section 5 provides information on how to integrate header
compression into the IPSec framework. The performance
of the compression mechanism is discussed in Section 6.
The paper closes with concluding remarks in Section 7.
2. Header compression
The IP tunneling mechanism (see Fig. 1a for details) is
an integral part of VPN solutions such as IPSec. A draw-
back is the enlarged datagram size, since two IP head-
ers must be transmitted. In order to decrease the packet
size, we propose to replace IP tunneling by an alterna-
tive header compression mechanism (see Fig. 1b). The idea
is as follows. The sending gateway replaces the inner IP
header by a compression header of smaller size. The com-
pression header contains among other an unique identifier.
This information enables the receiving gateway to recon-
struct the original IP header and forward the datagram
to its destination. The benefit comes from the fact that
the identifier can be used often while the assignment be-
tween IP and compression header must be transmitted only
a few times.
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Fig. 1. (a) IP tunneling: (1) Host A sends an IP packet to host B
via the gateways GA and GB, whereat the link between GA and GB
is an IP tunnel. (2) On receipt, GA stores the IP packet in a new
one. This mechanism offers several opportunities to manipulate
the IP packet to be tunneled. For example, IPSec encrypts the
packet before transmission. (3) GA sends the resulting packet
to GB. (4) GB unfolds the incoming packet, this is, it removes
the tunnel header and does some post-processing. For example,
IPSec decrypts the payload and checks it’t integrity. (5) Finally,
GB forwards the content to host B.
(b) Header compression: (1) Host A sends an IP packet to host B
via the gateways GA and GB. Instead of tunneling the packet di-
rectly, gateway GB performs the following manipulation. Based
on the IP header A→ B, GA computes an unique identifier idA→B.
(2) GA sends the pair (A→ B, idA→B) to gateway GB, which stores
the information in an internal lookup table. (3) GA replaces the
header A → B by the corresponding identifier idA→B and sends
the result to GB. This replacement is done for all following IP
packets with header A→ B. (4) On receipt, GB removes the tun-
nel header and the identifier. (5) GB uses idA→B to reconstruct the
original header A→ B. (6) GB combines A→ B with the payload.
(7) GB forwards the original IP packet to host B. If A sends an-
other datagram to B, then the same identifier can be used. Hence,
Step 3 can be omitted.
In the following we describe the header compression in
more detail. There are several questions to be discussed.
• How do we compute the compression header and the
identifier within?
• What is the structure of the header replacement?
• Which algorithms and data structures are required on
sender and receiver side?
• How is header compression integrated in the security
environment?
The following sections provide answers to these questions.
3. Computation of the compression
header
The reduction of the datagram size is achieved by the re-
placement of the original IP header by a smaller compres-
sion header. Its structure depends on the algorithm to be
used. There are two requirements to be met. Firstly, the in-
formation provided by compression header must be unique
such that the receiver can reconstruct the original header.
Secondly, the identifier should be usable for many different
IP headers so that the amount of assignment messages is
minimized.
A standard way to derive an unique identifier is universal
hashing with open addressing (see [4] for an excellent dis-
cussion of this topic). If the range of the hash function fits
into a 4-byte integer, there is a possibility of 232 simultane-
ous outgoing transmissions. If the hash function is chosen
uniformly at random then a good average case performance
is guaranteed.
To determine the input of the hash function, let’s take a look
on the structure of the IPv6 header depicted in Fig. 2.
The header size is 40 bytes. The largest part consists
of the source and destination address each with a size
of 16 bytes. Consider for a moment only datagrams sent
from the host A to the host B. In this case, the source and
destination address are constant. The contents of the fields
payload length, next header, and hop limit may change fre-
quently. The frequency of change of the contents stored
in the fields traffic class and flow label is difficult to esti-
mate. It depends on the quality of service features of the
underlying network. As a rule of thumb, we assume a low
modification rate.
Based on the above assumption, the fields version, flow la-
bel, traffic class, source address and destination address are
the input of the hash function. With other words, the hash
function maps 32 bytes to values of 4 byte length. Open
addressing guarantees unique hash keys given the num-
ber of different inputs is smaller than the range (i.e., 232).
Since the payload length, hop limit and next header en-
tries do not influence the outcome of the hash func-
tion, they additionally must be stored in the compression
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Fig. 2. Format of the IPv6 header.
header. This leads to the following structure of the
compression header:
1) hash key to determine version, flow label, traffic
class, source address and destination address;
2) payload length;
3) next header;
4) hop limit.
The size of the compression header is 8 bytes. Hence, it’s
size is 20% of the IP header.
Additional costs arise from the fact that the assignment
between hash key and according IP header parts must be
transmitted to the receiving gateways. The cost in terms of
data rate depends on the way, the assignment information
is distributed. Among others, two following methods are
conceivable.
• If the compression starts, the first datagrams are not
compressed. Instead, they are extended with an op-
tional header which contains the hash key. On re-
ceipt, the destination gateway stores this identifier
together with the associated parts of the IP header.
On this way, it learns how to decompress future data-
grams.
• In the beginning of compression, the first datagrams
are transmitted without modification. Additionally,
the assignment information is sent in a separate data-
gram.
Note, the transmission of the compression information is
critical for the whole communication. Hence, the spread of
the assignment information must be redundant to guarantee
that the destination gateway gets the assignment before the
compressed data.
The computation of the index is strictly sender oriented.
This is, the sending gateway computes the identifiers of all
outgoing datagrams independently on it’s own. As an ad-
vantage, the gateways do not need to coordinate the iden-
tifier creation. This keeps things simple and there is no
additional communication between the gateways required.
Furthermore, compression header assignment messages are
receivable even by those gateways which are in emission
control (emcon) condition.
4. Data structures
The mapping between identifiers and according IP header
fragments must be stored in an appropriate data structure.
The requirement to be met is the fast lookup of a given
index. The best performance is achieved by an hash table.
However this is not feasible because of the large range of the
deployed hash function and its many memory consumption.
A good compromise between space and performance is the
usage of a balanced search tree such as red-black trees [4].
Such a data structure guarantees time 0(log2 n) for search,
insertion and deletion where n is the number of elements
stored in the tree.
In order to compress a datagram the sending gateway acts
as follows. It computes the hash index of the IP header
fragment. Then, it replaces the header by the compression
header. If it is the first time, that this header fragment is
compressed, then the assignment information is sent the
receiving gateway. Additionally, the pair consisting of index
and header fragment is stored in the search tree.
On the receiving side, the data keeping is slightly different.
Since the identifier is correlated with the gateway which
created it, the receiver must manage a search tree for each
sending gateway. These trees are stored in another search
tree with the senders’ IP addresses as key.
The contents of the search trees change dynamically. An
entry may be deleted if the respective hash index was not
used for a certain time. This behavior increases the perfor-
mance of both running time and memory usage.
5. Integration into security services
The header compression mechanism is thought to be used
in combination with a secure transmission method. An ob-
vious approach is the IP security protocol suite [2]. Partic-
ularly, the compressed datagrams are sent via IPSec trans-
port mode. The usage of IPSec has the advantage of well-
developed administrative tools such as automated key ne-
gotiation. However, the header compression must be inte-
grated in the IPSec processing chain. There are two possi-
ble solutions. The first one is the extension of the operating
system’s kernel. The second one consists in the packet fil-
tering and manipulation in user space via the TUN/TAP
interface.
The integration of header compression into the operating
system results in optimal performance since the code runs
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in kernel space. However for modification of the kernel
the underlying source code is required. Even if the code
is available, the compression algorithm must be adapted to
the respective conditions of the operating system. Hence,
the work is not portable to other operating systems. An-
other drawback is the large amount of maintenance re-
quired to keep the software up to date with new kernel
releases.
The second approach uses the TUN/TAP interface for
packet manipulation. TUN/TAP is a standardized mech-
anism for manipulation of IP packets and Ethernet frames.
It is supported by major UNIX systems such as BSD, Linux
and Solaris and even by Windows XP. Hence, the code of
the header compression extension is portable between the
different operating systems with moderate effort. A poten-
tial disadvantage is a loss in performance since the com-
pression runs in user space and has to share the system’s
resources with the other processes.
Finally, we remark that IPSec is not the only way to de-
ploy header compression. An alternative is OpenVPN [1],
a VPN solution which uses the SSL/TLS protocol for
a secure data tunneling. Compared to IPSec, OpenVPN
is a lightweight VPN solution. It can be set up easily.
Additionally, OpenVPN provides a traffic shaping function-
ality to restrict the rate of data flowing to the tunnel.
6. Performance estimates
To evaluate the performance of the header compression
mechanism, two aspects have to be considered:
• Network delay. The compression of the IP header is
an additional processing step in the data flow which
increases the delay between sending and receiving
host.
• Data rate improvement. Header compression is de-
ployed with the goal of reducing the amount of data
to be transmitted. Hence, this criterion has to ana-
lyzed.
The influence on the network delay can be estimated by the
amount of time needed to compute the compression header.
The expensive part is the lookup of the hash index in the
balanced search tree.
A well-known result concerning universal hashing is the
following [4]. If the hash function h is randomly chosen
from a universal collection of hash functions and is used
to hash n keys into a table of size m, where m ≤ n, the
expected number of collisions involving a particular key is
less than 1. Hence, if the outgoing connections result in
n different hash indices, where n ≤ 232, then there are no
collisions in the average case. Since the keys are stored
in a balanced tree, the expected running time per lookup
operation is logarithmic in n.
What does this mean in practice? Assume, that the search
tree is based on red-black trees. Then a tree storing n hash
indices as height at most 2log2(n + 1). This value is an
upper bound for the cost of a lookup operation. Each entry
consists of at least 40 bytes (4 bytes for the index and 36
for the IP header fragment). This is a lower bound for
the memory needed to store the search tree. If any host in
the subnet has 10000 concurrent outgoing data connections
then the number of different hash indices is at most 10000.
Given the total number n of hosts, the upper bound of
different indices is 10000n. Using this bound, we estimate
the size of the tree for concrete values for n (Table 1).
Table 1
Tree size estimations
Hosts Indices Tree height Size [MB]
10 100000 34 3.815
20 200000 36 7.629
50 500000 38 19.073
100 1000000 40 38.147
200 2000000 42 76.294
500 5000000 45 190.735
Because the number of steps to compute a table lookup is
small even for a large number of hosts, the delay caused
by header compression is negligible on modern computer
hardware.
Fig. 3. The topology of a tactical military network at batallion
level.
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The improvement of the data rate is quite difficult to esti-
mate. It depends on both the topology of the underlying
network and the type of traffic and its distribution within
the network. The topology can be created based on exist-
ing military tactical networks. For an example, we refer
to Fig. 3. The determination of network traffic structure in
terms of distribution and service type is a difficult or even
impossible venture.
A promising approach consists in a statistical analysis via
a network simulation which is beyond the scope of this
paper. As an obvious rule of thumb, the gain of header
compression is high for network services which send data-
grams in an high frequency. A good example is voice
over IP (VoIP).
7. Conclusions and future work
This paper presents a new approach to header compression
to be used in combination with the IP security framework.
The benefit is a reduction of the overhead caused by IPSec
tunnel mode in terms of enlarged datagrams. Furthermore,
it can be integrated in common existing operating systems
with moderate effort. Currently the header compression is
a concept. Future steps are simulations based on network
simulator 2 and the implementation in a testing environ-
ment.
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